Wireless perimeter security device and network using same

ABSTRACT

A Radio Frequency based security system for providing security for wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) that allows the creation and maintenance of arbitrarily shaped secure wireless access areas with boundaries around said wireless Local Area Network and prevents access to the said wireless LAN from outside the perimeter of the secure area. The system includes a plurality of perimeter Radio Frequency Sentry Devices (RFSDs) that are employed to establish the boundaries of said secure area around said wireless LAN. The wireless LAN being secured may be an industry standard IEEE 802.11a, 801.11b or 802.11g based wireless LAN or any other wireless LAN that uses packet based communication protocols. The said RFSDs may be stand-alone devices or they may be connected to a wired or wireless Local Area Network.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

Under 35 USC §120, this application is a divisional application andclaims the benefit of priority to U.S. patent application Ser. No.11/933,346, which in turn is a divisional application and claims thebenefit of priority to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/946,851,filed Sep. 21, 2004, entitled “Wireless Perimeter Security Device andNetwork Using Same”, which in turn claims the benefit of priority toU.S. Provisional Application No. 60/504,615, filed Sep. 22, 2003 andU.S. Provisional Application No. 60/531,972, filed Dec. 24, 2003, all ofwhich are incorporated herein by reference.

FIELD OF INVENTION

The present invention relates generally to network security systems andmore particularly to wireless local area networking systems.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Modem communication and networking solutions are increasingly adoptingradio as a communications medium. Industry standards such as the IEEE802.11/g wireless LAN protocols, the ease of deployment, and the demandfor mobile access to data and applications have fueled an explosion inthe number of wireless Local Area Networks in use both in commercial aswell home environments.

An IEEE 802.11a/b/g based wireless LAN may be constructed as shown inFIG. 1, with at least one radio transmitter/receiver hub called anAccess Point (AP) 101-102 and one or more wireless devices 103-104, thatuse these APs 101 and 102 to communicate with each other as shown byradio links 105, or to access a network resource. The APs may beconnected to a wired LAN and thus can connect a wireless device 103-104to a plurality of network resources. It is relatively inexpensive to setup such a wireless LAN, which makes this a popular method for providingnetwork access. It is estimated that there are over 500 million wirelessLAN devices in use worldwide today.

However, the use of radio frequency as the medium brings with it aunique set of security related issues. Wireless LANs are inherentlydifferent in risk compared to a wired LAN. While in a wired LAN thelayers 1 and 2 of the network typically are protected by CATS cables ina secured building, in WLANs these layers are exposed because they areimplemented using radio waves and therefore cannot be contained by aphysical structure such as a building. Unlike wired networks,communication in Wireless LANs is not confined to a physical link suchas a CATS cable; rather, it is broadcast through the air in multipledirections simultaneously and is therefore visible, and may beintercepted and deciphered. Essentially anyone with an available radiocan eavesdrop and interject traffic into a wireless networkscommunication stream. This use of a non-physical communication link,i.e. radio waves, makes Wireless LANs more vulnerable to securitythreats than wired networks which use a cable such as a CATS cable topropagate data.

FIG. 1 illustrates a typical enterprise Wireless LAN. In IEEE802.11a/b/g based WLANs, wireless devices are permitted to seek out andtry to connect with other wireless devices in their vicinity as shown inWireless LAN area 106 and to form ad-hoc networks. This uncontrolledassociation further increases the threat to an enterprise Wireless LAN.For example, an authorized user on the corporate network can innocentlyconnect to a neighbor's network or be maliciously lured to connect to anundesirable or unauthorized wireless device outside of the companypremises and thereby compromise the entire corporate network. Forreasons such as these, mechanisms to secure Wireless LANs have become anarea of great interest and a huge business opportunity.

Two key factors have driven the development of WLAN Security solutionsand to a great degree existing industry standards:

1. “Wired network security mindset,” which believes/operates on theassumption that once the access to a network is controlled, the networkis safe. If data is encrypted for an added measure, then the result isfoolproof security.

2. Failure of solutions developed with this mindset has made vendorsmore determined to make it succeed—by developing stronger accesscontrols, stronger encryption, and dynamic keys.

The result is a myriad of expensive proprietary solutions that do notaddress the fundamental risks of using the radio frequency (RF) medium,and which, therefore, do not decrease the threats. Most of these passivesolutions are cumbersome to deploy, because they do not take advantageof existing wired network infrastructure and they are economicallyprohibitive to maintain.

PRIOR ART

Most existing attempts to provide security for industry standard IEEE802.11a/b/g Wireless LANs may be categorized as follows:

1. WEP based security solutions. This is the most basic form of securitythat is provided in a wireless LAN where a fixed secret code or keyknown only to authorized users of the WLAN is used to restrict access toonly those wireless devices that have the correct secret code or keyavailable to them. This scheme is based on an RC4 encryption algorithm,has been compromised and is no longer considered to be a viable securitysolution.

2. WPA/802.1x based security solutions. This scheme was invented toovercome the shortcomings of WEP. This scheme involves dynamic keys andthe authentication of the key each time a wireless device attempts toconnect to the network. This scheme has also been compromised. There areseveral issues with Key management and weakness in the cryptographyscheme. It has been shown that it is possible to decipher the secret keyand gain unauthorized access to the wireless LAN. It is widely acceptedthat this method does not provide adequate security for a wireless LAN.

3. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). This mechanism was adopted from thewired LAN side. Security is provided by creating virtual connectionsbetween wireless devices and their destination by virtue of encryptingthe data transfer between them that is not decipherable by anunauthorized entity. This scheme works well in the wired LAN domainbecause the data is transmitted over a physical link such as a CATScable. Unless someone can tap into that CATS cable, they cannot view theencrypted data stream. However, in the case of a wireless LAN, the datastream may be intercepted by a radio eavesdropper and potentiallydecoded. More importantly, it would be possible for a hostile entity tomerely establish an ad-hoc connection with the authorized wirelessdevice at one end of the virtual path and camouflage itself as if itwere the authorized device itself. This is referred to as spoofing. Ithas been demonstrated that this type of security breach is possible.

4. Intrusion Detection Systems. These solutions rely on their ability todetect any radio frequency activity outside a known perimeter. As such,they are rendered ineffective by hostile entities that eavesdrop using apassive or listen-only mode and thus do not generate any radio frequencyactivity. It is widely accepted that this solution does not provideadequate security for wireless LANs.

5. Perimeter Control systems. These solutions depend on their ability todifferentiate between authorized and unauthorized sources of radiotransmission by measuring the relative signal strength of the radiofrequency carrier signal. However, naturally occurring phenomenon suchas multi-path signals may easily cause Use alarms or camouflageunauthorized sources. In addition, passive eavesdropping is not detectedby this solution. It is widely accepted that this solution is not idealfor providing a secure wireless LAN.

Thus the inability of any of these above approaches to restrict accessto the radio waves carrying the Wireless LAN traffic renders themvulnerable to sophisticated radio frequency eavesdroppers and hencecannot be deemed secure. Accordingly, what is needed is a system andmethod to overcome these problems. The present invention addresses sucha need.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

A wireless network comprising: at least one wireless device thattransmits radio traffic; and at least one radio frequency securitydevice (RFSD) for altering the radio traffic based upon a definedperimeter of the network.

The present invention is directed to a system and method thateffectively eliminates the stated vulnerabilities of the uncontrolledradio frequency medium and unauthorized association of wireless devicesin a wireless LAN by creating a secure area that physically isolates theWireless LAN and its associated network traffic.

The present invention eliminates data sniffing or interception of radiowaves and ensures that authorized wireless devices connect only withinsuch secured zone. The present invention thus provides a unique andcomprehensive security solution for wireless LANs. It should be clearthat the present invention maybe used by itself or in conjunction withany of the said existing solutions to provide security for a wirelessLAN.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows a typical Enterprise Wireless LAN.

FIG. 2 shows a typical Enterprise Wireless LAN with external parasiticdevices causing security hazard due to RF signal leakage.

FIG. 3 shows an Enterprise Wireless LAN with Radio Frequency securitydevices deployed creating a secure Wireless LAN area and denying accessto external parasitic devices.

FIG. 4 illustrates a first example of multipath issues.

FIG. 5 illustrates a second example of multipath issues.

FIG. 6 shows examples of indoor radio frequency multi-path travel.

FIG. 7 shows three possible configurations of an installation on asingle 100′×100′ building.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram of the RFSD for a single channel 802.11 typeprotocol set.

FIG. 9 a illustrates active packet cloaking, with channel content andutilization outside the wall without RFSD installed.

FIG. 9 b illustrates active packet cloaking, with channel content andutilization outside the wall with RFSD installed.

FIG. 10 is a flowchart for the active packet cloaking technique employedin the radio frequency security device (RFSD) for one channel ofWireless LAN.

FIG. 11 is an example of the RFSD to create RF sanitized environments(dagger).

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present invention relates generally to network security systems andmore particularly to wireless local area networking systems. Thefollowing description is presented to enable one of ordinary skill inthe art to make and use the invention and is provided in the context ofa patent application and its requirements. Various modifications to thepreferred embodiments and the general principles and features describedherein will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art. Thus, thepresent invention is not intended to be limited to the embodimentsshown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with theprinciples and features described herein.

The present invention provides for a system and method that allows forthe “cloaking”, i.e., rendering of radio packets invisible, of wirelessor radio wave traffic from devices within a defined space, using devicescalled Radio Frequency Security Devices (RFSDs) that define theperimeter of that secure space. This is shown in FIG. 7, which depicts aplurality of deployment choices of the present invention. The systemincludes one or more RFSDs 701 and an associated Central Commander unit705 connected to each other over either a wireless (WLAN) or wirednetwork (LAN) 715.

FIG. 2 shows a typical wireless LAN (WLAN) deployed in a building. Thecomponents of this WLAN are one or more Access Points (APs) 201-202 anda plurality of wireless access devices 203-204. The devices areconnected to the APs 201-202 and to each other via radio connections205. The Access Points (AP) 201-202 are usually connected to a wired LANbackbone. FIG. 2 also shows the excursion of WLAN radio traffic 207outside the desired perimeter, i.e., the confines of the building. Thisenables parasitic external wireless devices 209, 210 and 211 to receive,decipher and interfere with the authorized and legitimate members of theWLAN.

The vulnerable WLAN shown in FIG. 2 may be secured at the radio wavelevel by using the present invention as shown in FIG. 3. The secure WLANin FIG. 3 includes the WLAN shown in FIG. 2 and includes AP 301-302;multiple wireless access devices 303-304 combined with plurality ofinstances of the Radio Frequency Security Devices (RFSDs) 312 placed onthe perimeter of the building or secure WLAN area 307. As shown in FIG.3, there is no excursion of WLAN radio traffic beyond the perimeter 307defined by placement of multiple instances of the RFSD 312. Thisprevention of radio traffic excursion outside the desired secureperimeter prevents un-authorized or hostile wireless devices 309, 310and 311 from receiving or interfering with the WLAN radio traffic fromwithin the secure area 307.

The RFSD is shown in FIG. 8, and includes a radio transmitter andreceiver combination 803, a micro-controller 806 and a set of antennas801-802 and antenna steering units 802,804. The RFSD may also include abattery unit 808, an Ethernet controller 809 and an Infra-Red (IR)communications unit 807. Also integrated into the RFSD is a ReverseEngineering Prevention Unit 810, which is an electronic device that willdestroy the RFSD circuitry if it is tampered with. As shown in FIG. 3,these RFSDs 312 create an invisible radio wall 307 around a definedspace outside of which the wireless radio traffic within the said spaceis rendered invisible and indecipherable. In effect, radio data packetscrossing the said radio frequency wall 307 are destroyed, using atechnique called Active Packet Cloaking (APC), thereby rendering theminvisible to unauthorized wireless devices that exist outside the securespace. The present inventive approach to “cloaking” i.e., renderingradio packets invisible, may be applied to cellular or pager networks orindoor/outdoor to wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) and communicationprotocols such as IEEE 802.11xx. Essentially this inventive approach canbe applied to any packet switched digital communication.

Component Descriptions Antenna

The antennas 801 and 802 shown in FIG. 8 used in the RFSD aredirectional antennas, with variable coverage pattern, and a very highfront to back ratio.

Wireless Device

The wireless devices may be any known portable or transportable deviceas shown in FIG. 3, configured for wireless communications, such as amobile telephone, personal digital assistant (PDA) 304, pager, emaildevices, laptop 303, desktop computers, printers, projectors, AccessPoints 301, 302 and 310, repeaters, cameras or any other network-enableddevice. Many of such devices may be handheld devices, but other wirelessdevices that are not of such a compact size could also be detected andcloaked. These mobile devices are configured to communicate with anetwork through a wireless interface.

Cloaking Description

Referring to FIG. 7, the cloaking system consists of a plurality ofdevices called Radio Frequency Security Devices (RFSDs) 701, placedaround a predetermined perimeter to create a secure area for a WirelessLAN of interest. The systems may be enhanced by the inclusion of atleast one data processing system. The data processing system may includea user interface and includes memory to facilitate the initial setup,operation, and maintenance of the system, collectively known as theCentral Commander 705. The RFSDs may be stand-alone or may be connectedto each other via a wireless or wired network 715. The network may alsoinclude or have access to a variety of functionality and data, which maybe hosted on the network or on subsystems or on systems accessible viathe network, possibly via another one or more networks.

Defined or Secured Space Definition

A defined or secure space is comprised of a set of defined regions,areas or location (collectively known as “locales”). A locale may bedefined as an interior or exterior space or location, or a combinationthereof. For example, a conference room may be defined as a locale. Eachlocale is defined within the system in relationship to the digital formof the physical space (maps of the building/structure). Locales aredefined with a multi-step approach, and at any time a decision may bemade by the system that enough accuracy has been achieved and more stepsare not required.

Defining the Space

As the first step, the placement of a plurality of RFSDs on theperimeter combined with the radiation pattern of the receiving andtransmitting antennas of these RFSDs, defines accurately but incoarse-grained quality the outline of the perimeter. The second level ofgranularity is achieved by using the difference of signal strengthsusing two or more directional antennas facing in different directions.The third level of granularity is achieved by using signal-timinganalysis; using Time (Difference) of Arrival (TOA or TDOA) basedmeasurements. Locale definition should preferably be achieved withoutinvolving any RF surveys or provide training to the system, where aninitial radio frequency propagation map has to be plotted and it becomesspecific to an environment.

Time (Difference) of Arrival (TOA or TDOA)

Time (Difference) of Arrival (TOA or TDOA) are well-defined techniquesthat have been used for years for locating transmitting devices based onthe fact that RF travels at a constant speed of light (an assumedconstant for most practical work), so the farther the transmitter isfrom a receiver the longer it will take for the signal to arrive. In thepreferred embodiment of the TDOA implementation in the RFSD, there aretwo or more receiving systems that are separated from each other by afixed and known distance.

By doing a signal analysis of the two signals a very accuratedetermination can be made about the direction of the signal origination.The use of one or more antennas once again separated by a fixed andknown distance, will give the distance of the originating signal. Forexample, in FIG. 4, the signal 412 originating from a device 406-407-408inside the “Secured Space” 410, will reach the four antennas402-403-404-405 in the RFSD at different times and different signalstrengths, depending its location. Similarly in FIG. 5, the signal 512originating from a device 511-512-513 outside the “Secured Space” 510,will reach the four antennas 402-403-404-405 in the RFSD at differenttimes and with different signal strengths, depending on the location ofits origin. Wireless devices 406-407-408 and 506-507-508 are shown asexample locations inside and outside the “Secured Space” respectively.

Resolving Multi-Path Problems

One other major problem for location systems like the one describedabove results from multi-path radio waves. The problem is much morepronounced indoors, due to many more reflection surfaces present inclose proximity. While there are multiple ways to combat this issue, thepreferred way of doing this is achieved by doing the signal analysis inthe smallest time window possible so that the multi-path does not evenstart taking place. FIG. 6 depicts a few examples of how a signal from atransmitter (Tx) 601 can reach the receiver (Rx) 602. There are aninfinite number of combinations on how the signal can reach the Rx, buta few—603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608—are shown for the purpose of thisdiscussion. If the minimum distance between the transmitter Tx 601 andreceiver Rx 602 is D meters, then the minimum time for the first signalto reach from transmitter Tx 601 to receiver Rx 602 is D/C seconds whereC=speed of light in meters per sec.

All the other multi-path signals will reach the receiver Rx 602 afterthis first signal has been received. Because this system is applied topacket switched networks and not constant carriers, a very accuratedetermination is possible. The determination of D may be a combinationof empirical and computed results.

Active Packet Cloaking

Once the secured space is defined and the RFSDs are in place along theperimeter, the RFSD is enabled to perform Active Packet Cloaking (APC).APC is the core of the “cloaking” invention. The APC system is composedof 3 major components: a receiving side, a transmitting side and controlelectronics. The receiving side is composed of one or more receivingsystems and the transmitting side is also composed of one or moretransmitting systems. The receiving and transmitting systems willtypically be pointing in different directions. The two are controlledwith control electronics to control when and what is to be received ortransmitted.

Packet cloaking is achieved by identifying a packet originating fromwithin the Secured Space and instantly transmitting an altered packetout and away from the Secured Space perimeter. The transmission istypically at the same power level as the received packet that triggeredit. The net result is that a receiver outside the Secured Space cannotdecipher the packets that are originating from inside the Secured Space.Any communication between devices outside the secured area will workunaffected, as only the packets originating from within the SecuredSpace are being altered.

For example—The IEEE 802.11a/b/g protocols use the half duplex CSMA/CAprotocol for access arbitration. CSMA/CA allows multiple people to use asingle communication channel, with only one person transmitting at atime. With the present invention, i.e., the “Cloaking” system in place,the channel usage remains unaltered and identical to that prior to theintroduction of said “Cloaking” system. The only difference now is thatthe slot being used by a transmitter inside the Secured Space nowcontains altered data as opposed to the original valid IEEE 802.11/gpacket.

Shown in FIGS. 9A and 9B are three pairs of IEEE 802.11/g compliantwireless devices, communicating on the same channel. The authorizeddevices 902-903-904 are inside the “Secured Space”; the two outsidedevices 910-912 are on an independent network outside the “SecuredSpace” on the same channel; and the parasite device 920 is a maliciousstation that is listening to both inside WLAN traffic 905 and outsideWLAN traffic 915.

FIGS. 9 a and 9 b the show the wireless packet stream 950 and channelutilization for the above environment. To demonstrate the principleclearly a perfect scenario is assumed, with fixed length packets905-915, no wasted slots and no random back off interval, etc. Thepacket stream 950 consists of a sequence of packets from both the insideWLAN 905 and the outside WLAN 915 in a chronological order. As shown inFIG. 9 a, with the RFSDs absent, the individual packets 905-915 areclearly visible in the stream 950 outside the “Cloaked Space”.

When the RFSD 901 is present only the packets 905 originating fromwithin the “Cloaked Space” going past the RFSD 901 perimeter, arecloaked and effectively destroyed as shown by the packets 000 in thepacket stream 950 illustrated in FIG. 9 b, thereby creating an“invisible wall”, for the packets. The net result is that the channelutilization remains unaltered for the inside WLAN traffic 905 and theoutside WLAN traffic 915, just that the “outsiders” cannot see the“insiders” wireless traffic. The parasite wireless device 920 now canstill listen to the valid communication 915 of the outside orunprotected WLAN, and none of the two outside wireless devices see/hearthe inside or protected WLAN traffic 905. Outside the secure perimeterWLAN traffic packets that originate from within the secure area appearas blank packets 000 in the packet stream 950.

The inside network, however, will see the outside WLAN, but can neverconnect to it, as any packets coming from the inside, going outside aredestroyed. In order for the inside network not to see the outside, theRFSDs may be enhanced to prevent the outside radio packets from enteringthe Secured Space in the similar manner.

Flow Chart of APC

FIG. 10 is a flowchart which describes the Active Packet CloakingTechnique employed in the RFSD for one channel of Wireless LAN.

Self-Tuning Mode

An RFSD gathers and maintains information about its surrounding peersand their status to maintain redundancy and allow for self-healing ofthe network, in case the need arises. Self-healing would be required incase one of the RFSDs malfunctions or executes at reduced power levelsdue to a failure or partial failure in the RFSD or the data processingsystem.

The central controller typically triggers the self-tuning mode. However,as an alternative, the RFSDs can initiate this action independently aswell. The system sets itself up by having one or more RFSD transmit andthe others listen, in multiple combinations, to gather sufficient dataabout the radio frequency environment, to create a Radio Frequency mapof the area. This mode can be triggered periodically during idle time,based on a configuration or a default factory setting. Correctiveactions will include notification to the Central Controller, audioand/or visual indication at the device, adjusting the power output ofthe neighboring RFSDs, adjusting the antenna directivity and radiationpatterns, and adopting a low risk approach of blocking all suspiciouspackets. The compromise is made in favor of security over efficiency.

RFSD

FIG. 8 provides a block diagram of a single channel RFSD, suited forIEEE 802.11a/b/g/protocols. The preferred embodiment of the RFSD willinclude transmit antenna 801 and receive antenna 802; multiple radios803, one or more radio direction finding (RDF) units 805 and controlledwith a micro controller 806. The radios 803 will be selected dependingon the protocol of interest.

The RDF unit 805 is a signal analyzer that will compare two signals forstrength and time of arrival and is also controlled by the microcontroller. To account for the differences in the electronics in themultiple paths from the antenna to the RDF unit 805, a calibration willbe done as a part of the “self-tuning” to generate and store an offsetvalue to be applied during a real measurement. The Antenna steering unit802-804 may be a phased may antenna control, or a simple antenna switchto transmit with another antenna present in the RFSD, or a physicalantenna rotator, or a combination thereof. Multiple channel coveragewill be achieved by replication of the above-mentioned architecture orby multiplexing across the channels.

Sanitized Wireless Zone (Dagger)

A direct effect of turning the transmitting antennas to point in thesame direction as that of the receiving antennas and/or reversing thereceiving antennas as the transmitting antennas, enables the RFSD to beused to “sanitize” a Defined Space where a specified type of packetswitching digital communication wireless network will be disabled. FIG.11 describes one of the possible applications. The two transceivers 1105and 1106 in FIG. 11 attempt to establish communication, the wirelessprotocol handshake never completes successfully, as the RFSD destroysall packets 1111-1112 that it sees originating from within the“Sanitized Space”. The outside network, comprised of AP 1101 andwireless device 1102, also never sees the handshake that is trying totake place inside. The insiders, however, will see all the wirelesstraffic that is happening outside the “Defined Space”.

Cloak and Dagger Application

The use of the RFSDs in both possible manifestations, i.e., cloakingpackets leaking out from a secure space perimeter or cloaking packetswithin a secure space perimeter, allows the creation of sanitized, openaccess and secure zones.

Reverse Cloak Application

Reversing the Receiving and Transmitting Antennas on the RFSDs, resultsin the outside wireless networks being hidden from view of the insiders.

Forward and Reverse Cloaking Application

Using the combination of the reversed Cloak and the regular Cloak,creates a system where not only the inside wireless network is hiddenfrom the outsiders, but the outside wireless network is also not seen bythe insiders.

Redundancy

Redundancy is applied in two forms, one is within the RFSD by havingbackup Transmitting and Receiving systems, which can be used eitherunder extreme unexpected load conditions and or environment changes orwhenever the RFSD decides that these backup units need to be kicked inas well for additional security, or when one of the Tx/Rx chainsfails/partially fails.

The other form of redundancy is by adding additional devices on theSecured Space, as shown in an example in FIG. 7.

Battery Backup

Two levels of battery backups are provided in the RFSD, one to ensurecontinued service during power failures where the internal wirelessnetwork is still functioning. As the battery power is limited, thepreferred way is to power the Cloaking system with the same powergrid/circuit as the internal wireless network to be secured. Here againthe power will be most conveniently delivered using Power Over Ethernet(POE) or slightly modified POE for higher power rating. The second levelof the battery backup is for the controllers, to have enough time toperform an elegant shutdown.

Reverse Engineering Proofing

Reverse engineering causes a huge impact not only on individualcompanies, but economically in general, as well. In order to discouragethese malpractices by people or companies with ulterior motives, a wellthought out “Self Destruct Mechanism” has been designed to put insidethe RFSDs.

At the first level, stolen/lost RFSDs are useless without theauthorization of the Central Controller. Each RFSD and CentralController will be hard-coded, with a GUID like identification and eachRFSD is further tied with a Central Controller, discouraging malicioususe of the RFSDs. For special purposes an override mode will exist thatwill let the RFSD function without the Central Controller as well.

At the second level, any attempt to open the RFSD without a specialelectronic key (RFSD Key), will result in burning out most of thecritical circuitry including some of the PCB tracks with minimum visualdamage. This is done with critically placed fuses across the boards toblow up the critical components; this power is derived from the batterybackup and capacitors.

The RFSD Key will be a mix of unpublished sequence delivered using IR/RFand proximity switches and receive an ACK/NACK confirmation back fromthe lock inside the RFSD. The RFSD Key distribution will be limited tomanufacturing only and not to the field, except with prior approval,thereby discouraging stealing/copying of the key.

Alternate Access to RFSD

As it is possible that the RFSDs may be mounted in difficult to reachplaces, and there may be times that direct access to the device isrequired to update/configure/run diagnostics an alternate method ofcommunication is made available through an Infrared (IR) port. The otheralternative to access the RFSDs will be via another piece of softwarethat can hook up directly to the Ethernet cable coming out from theRFSD.

Physical Installation of the Cloaking System

There are lots of different scenarios that can apply to the CloakingSystem deployment, of which some have been pictorially described in FIG.7. The actual mounting of the RFSDs will be highly dependent on thetype, shape and the surroundings of the “Space to be cloaked”, however atypical installation will be done just outside the building or on a polemount similar to a security camera or such other device.

In some cases it may even be possible to mount the RFSDs on the insideof a building say on a window or other such opening, it may even bepossible to do a “split install” in which case part of the device isinside the building connected to an Ethernet jack and power or a POEjack/device, and another part sits in a weather proofed enclosure justoutside the wall, connected with a cable that has been drilled throughthe wall. All of this mounting will be done by following the guidelinesof the building and the Federal and State codes for installing externaldevices on or near a building, electrically connecting the devices toinside the building. Similar Codes will be followed for mounting theRFSDs and passing cables in an outdoor setup as well.

Central Controller Description

The Central Controller (CC) is the control authority and holds knowledgeof all other systems in place. As and when the RFSDs power up, theyregister themselves with the CC, the RFSDs can communicate with eachother via the CC, or lookup another RFSD from CC and establish a directcontact with it. The CC is a piece of software running on a computer onthe same network, where the RFSDs are connected. The communicationbetween the RFSDs and the CC is done over a secure tunnel to discouragetheft and misuse. This also allows deployment across insecure networks.There can be one or more CCs that collect the information from and sendinformation to the RFSDs. Essentially the CC works on a distributedarchitecture, where each CC talks to a set of RFSDs and send theinformation to the others as well. This architecture allows forredundancy, fail-safe operation and load balancing.

The User Interface (UI) in the CC is used for defining the spacepreferably with the use of a map of the space being cloaked; thisinformation is then used for tuning the definition of the space. The CCcollects the telemetry data from the RFSDs to monitor its health andstatistics, to be displayed on a UI and/or stored for generatingreports. The CC is also used as a single point software upgrade for oneor more RFS devices.

The CC will also have SNMP interfaces available so that the Blue Leafsystem can be monitored/administered using third party networkmanagement software, e.g., IBM Tivoli or HP OpenView.

An API will be provided for the CC that will allow installations orcompanies using proprietary network management solutions, to integratethis system into their solution, so that the CC's UI need not be used.

Although the present invention has been described in accordance with theembodiments shown, one of ordinary skill in the art will readilyrecognize that there could be variations to the embodiments and thosevariations would be within the spirit and scope of the presentinvention. Accordingly, many modifications may be made by one ofordinary skill in the art without departing from the spirit and scope ofthe appended claims.

1. A method for determining placement of radio frequency securitydevices (RFSDs) within a secured space to create a perimeter for primarydevices of a wireless local area network (WLAN) within said securedspace and to reduce detection of transmitted packets that go on anexcursion from said WLAN to external networks, said method comprising:determining a radio frequency map of a network environment; determiningsignal strength of an external network; determining signal strength ofthe WLAN; comparing the determined signal strengths; determiningradiation patterns; and based on said compared signal strengths and saiddetermined radiation patterns, adjusting antenna systems of each RFSD tocloak or sanitize an affected packet in response to one of a packetemitted from said WLAN or a packet emitted from said external network,which approaches and traverses said perimeter.
 2. The method of claim 1,further comprising: identifying one or more external wireless networksto the WLAN; identifying said external wireless networks with respect toproximity of location to said perimeter of the WLAN; identifying signalstrength of said one or more identified external wireless networks; andarranging antenna systems of predetermined RFSDs to cause wirelesstraffic of said one or more external wireless networks to beundetectable by the WLAN.
 3. The method of claim 1, further comprising:identifying one or more external wireless networks to the WLAN;identifying said external wireless networks with respect to proximity oflocation to said perimeter of the WLAN; identifying signal strength ofsaid one or more identified external wireless networks; and arrangingantenna systems of predetermined RFSDs to cause wireless traffic of theWLAN to be undetectable by said one or more external wireless networks.4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: identifying one or moreexternal wireless networks to the WLAN; identifying said externalwireless networks with respect to proximity of location to saidperimeter of the WLAN; identifying signal strength of said one or moreidentified external wireless networks; arranging antenna systems ofpredetermined RFSDs to cause wireless traffic of an identified affectedpacket to be undetectable in relation to its trajectory across an edgesaid of said perimeter; and re-evaluating signal strength in response tosaid antenna arrangement.
 5. The method of claim 4 wherein said securedspace further comprises a central controller (CC) unit in communicationwith each of said RFSDs and having: a control authority containingknowledge of said primary and of secondary devices; a central registry,where each of said RFSDs can respectively register themselves with theCC unit; and a switchable communications means for enablingcommunication between each of said RFSDs and said CC unit.
 6. The methodof claim 5 wherein communication between said CC unit and each RFSD isbidirectional.
 7. The method of claim 5 wherein said RFSDs comprise atransmission means for transmitting data across the WLAN and a LAN, areceiver means for receiving data across the WLAN and the LAN, acontroller means for controlling the RFSDs, respectively, across theWLAN and the LAN, a power means for powering said RFSDs singly orcollectively, and a directionally steerable communication means forenabling effective communications of RFSDs across the WLAN and the LAN.8. The method of claim 7 wherein each RFSD comprises: an antenna systemwhich has a capability to determine signal strength comparisons at highspeeds and wherein each RFSD is configured to: determine time ofdifference of arrival (TDOA) comparisons at high speeds; and determinephase difference measurements at high speeds.
 9. The method of claim 8wherein each antenna system comprises: a plurality of directionalantennas facing in a same direction.
 10. The method of claim 9 whereinsaid antennas are of types that include parabolic, yagi, patch, quad,bi-quad, dish, collinear, vertical, dipole, and phased array.
 11. Themethod of claim 10, further comprising: tuning said secured space byusing at least one of said RFSDs to transmit a first signal to anotherof said RFSDs so as to enable others of said RFSDs receive transmissionof said first signal to determine radio frequency characteristics ofsaid secured space and any of said external wireless networks.
 12. Themethod of claim 11 wherein at least one of said RFSDs includes a radiofrequency detection unit (RDF).
 13. The method of claim 12, furthercomprising identifying a packet from an external wireless networkapproaching said perimeter.
 14. The method of claim 13 wherein saidaffected packet is transmitted towards said WLAN.
 15. The method ofclaim 13 wherein said affected packet is transmitted away from saidWLAN.
 16. The method of claim 15 wherein said perimeter is equivalent toan area of one or more floors of a building or locale.
 17. The method ofclaim 16 wherein said WLAN is one of a x.25 or IEEE 802.11 protocolnetwork.
 18. The method of claim 17 wherein at least one of said RFSDshas a directional, steerable antenna.
 19. A security-enhanced wirelesscommunications system, comprising: one or more primary wireless devicesforming part of wireless local area network (WLAN), and capable ofcommunication at least in part by wireless packets; and a communicationssecurity device (CSD) for each edge of a perimeter of a locale, whereineach CSD is optimally placed along a respective said edge to create saidperimeter for said primary devices of the WLAN and to reduce detectionof transmitted packets that go on an excursion from said WLAN toexternal networks, said system operative to: determine signal strengthof the external networks; determine signal strength of the WLAN; comparesignal strengths; determine radiation patterns; and based on saidcompared signal strengths and said determined radiation patterns, adjustantenna systems of each CSD to cloak or sanitize an affected packet. 20.A security-enhanced wireless communications system, comprising: two ormore primary wireless devices forming a wireless local area network(WLAN) and configured to operatively communicate using wireless packets,the WLAN having two or more radio frequency security devices (RFSDs),each of which is positioned along an edge of a perimeter of a securedspace and each of which is capable to affect packet traffic from theWLAN or from an external network, said system being configured tooperatively affect said external network packet traffic by beingconfigured to: create a radio frequency map of an environment of theWLAN and the external network; identify one or more external wirelessnetworks to the WLAN; identify said external wireless networks withrespect to proximity of location to said perimeter; identify signalstrength of said one or more identified external wireless networks;re-position one or more of said RFSDs along an edge of said perimeter ofthe secured space in response to the identified signal strength;identify packet characteristics of an affected packet; adjust one ormore of said RFSDs to respond and transmit at least one altered packethaving similar characteristics of said affected packet; and transmitsaid altered packet towards or away from said WLAN in response to atraversing direction of said affected packet so as to cause saidaffected packet to be undetectable.